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Victimhood to Agency:                                            
A Constructionist Comparison of                                            
Sexual Orientation to Religious Orientation 
Carmen M. Butler1 
Introduction 
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”2  Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s words bear a timeless truth to the extent that he spoke 
about our nation’s aspirations for “justice for all.”  But when Coretta Scott 
King expounded on Dr. King’s words, she took the notion of “justice for 
all” to a new level.  Specifically, she tied the notion of civil rights for 
African Americans to other groups in American society when she said, 
“Freedom from discrimination based on sexual orientation is surely a 
fundamental human right in any great democracy, as much as freedom from 
racial, religious, gender, or ethnic discrimination.”3 
Some gay4 rights advocates have seized upon Ms. King’s characterization 
of the struggle for human rights to advocate specifically for gay rights.  But 
in so doing, have they chosen a less advantageous comparison of rights?5  In 
this essay, I argue that when gay rights advocates base their advocacy on a 
comparison of gay rights to civil rights for African Americans, the 
essentialist nature of their comparison is detrimental.    An essentialist 
comparison is detrimental because it limits the dynamics of sexuality to the 
perceived dynamics of race–a fixed, unalterable status.  It forces gays to 
pair their demands for equality with victimizing assertions that “I was born 
this way and I can’t help it.”  Whatever the scientific support for this 
assertion, it is psychologically demeaning.  
Gay rights advocates and gays would improve long-term basic rights6 
recognition for and amongst gays if they employed a constructionist 
approach.  A constructionist approach focuses less on victimizing 
immutable status and more on one’s own agency.7  Constructionist 
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arguments that sexuality is an exercise in freedom of conscience would 
liberate the gay image from the victimization paradigm inherent in 
essentialism,8 cast off unrealistic stereotypes imposed on gays and gay 
advocates, and reflect more accurately the dynamic nature of human 
sexuality.  Under constructionist theory, gay rights advocates can also draw 
a more beneficial analogy between sexual orientation and religious 
orientation.  By focusing on the personal integrity inherent in the freedom 
of conscience rather than the helplessness inherent in status, and by acting 
as agents rather than victims, constructionist gay rights advocates can obtain 
a more meaningful recognition of gay rights. 
In this essay, I critique the paradigms that judges, lawyers, and advocates 
use when they interpret and apply the law with respect to gay rights.  I 
begin by examining essentialist and constructionist approaches to gay 
rights.  In Part I, I define essentialism and constructionism and measure 
their potential impact on the gay rights movement.  In Part II, I compare the 
application of each theory in litigation.  Although essentialists frequently 
compare sexual orientation to race, the way they use the comparison might 
not advance gay rights.  I conclude that gay rights advocates could secure 
more meaningful rights recognition with a constructionist theory that 
analogizes sexual orientation to religious orientation, an orientation based 
on the notion of freedom of conscience.  Through asserting freedom of 
conscience, gay rights advocates can finally achieve what the gay rights 
movement has been missing: a way to unabashedly reclaim basic rights.9 
I.  ESSENTIALISM V. CONSTRUCTIONISM 
A.  A Tale of Two Theories 
In recent decades, gay rights advocates have commonly used essentialist 
theory as a platform for promoting gay rights.  According to essentialists, 
being gay is a biological fact.10  “Gays can’t help it,” the argument goes, 
“they [or we] were born this way.”11  In contrast to essentialists, 
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constructionists believe that being gay is part of the identity a person 
develops in the course of her lifetime, not simply at birth.  
The contrast between essentialism and constructionism raises the 
question: if being “born this way” is a category that boxes gays into a static, 
immutable category, why would gay rights advocates choose to employ it?  
The primary reason these advocates rely on essentialist theory is to obtain 
status and rights as a suspect class that warrants constitutional and statutory 
protection.12  A renowned gay rights theorist, Joe Sartelle, explains that gay 
essentialists have a “profound collective wish . . . for ‘proof’ that our 
sexuality is forced upon us, that [our sexuality] . . . does not involve free 
choice and free will.”13  By arguing that sexuality is an imposition and not a 
choice, gay essentialists create a “biological destiny” that is easier for 
politicians, family, and friends to accept.14  Essentialist advocates point to 
“gay brain studies,” studies that posit that gays have unique brain 
structures.15  Still, the essentialist approach, as it is currently expounded, 
has proved counterproductive as a vehicle for securing gay rights for three 
reasons. 
First, when an essentialist gay person claims that she cannot help her 
condition, she basically claims that she16 is helpless, a victim in her own 
skin.17  In so doing, she unwittingly marginalizes gays as a minority 
identity.18  She inadvertently invites others to conclude that her own and 
others’ minority sexual orientation is a condition that might one day be 
scientifically cured or otherwise eliminated.  Worst of all, she loses the 
opportunity to foster a more accurate understanding of what it means to be 
gay, lesbian, or queer.19  Meanwhile, the political and social gains she can 
make for gays are limited to those she can obtain on the basis of supposed 
victim status. 
Second, the essentialist advocate fails to capture reality.   He fails to 
recognize the societal influences that shape a person’s own perceptions of 
sexuality over time.20  Essentialist theory instead offers “a false premise that 
if you are something, that’s all you are” and that is all you will ever be.21  
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Our essentialist advocate cannot explain, for example, how Anne Heche 
could fall in love with Ellen Degeneres when she was not “born a 
lesbian.”22  She is equally at a loss to explain why Ani Di Franco, a bisexual 
and feminist singer who gained fame among lesbians, took a man to be her 
partner. 
Third, the essentialist advocate tends to promote stereotypes.  
Specifically, she tends to support what Sartelle calls the “heterosexual 
alibi.”23  The heterosexual alibi is the belief that a gay person can be easily 
identified by her non-sexual behavior.  For example, the heterosexual alibi 
supports the misconception that just because a woman is a feminist, she 
must be a lesbian.24  It also supports the assumption that just because a man 
played college football, he could not possibly be gay because, according to 
the heterosexual alibi, gay men are not likely to be good football players.25  
Based on this tendency to stereotype, essentialists struggle to explain Rock 
Hudson, a movie star no one would have guessed could be gay because he 
was just what a man is “supposed to be”—masculine and popular with 
women.  In this way, essentialists—intentionally or otherwise—link a 
person’s sexuality to a number of other assumptions about that person’s 
preferences in other realms of life.26   
In contrast to essentialists, constructionists assume that sexuality is a 
social fact about a person.27  Constructionists describe a “social fact” as a 
matter of conscience—an exercise of free will—rather than an immutable 
condition.  While constructionists do not entirely rule out the possibility that 
some people are born gay or that there might be something innate about 
sexuality, they allow people to first define themselves as they are, rather 
than acquiescing to definitions of sexuality imposed by a heterosexual 
standard.28 
As a legal tool, there are at least three ways constructionist theory 
overcomes barriers inherent in essentialist theory.  First, because 
constructionists believe that sexuality is an exercise of conscience and an 
affirmation of human freedom,29 they are able to vanquish the stifling image 
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that gays are somehow their own victims.  Constructionist advocates 
capture the exercise of free will and personal autonomy that is inherent in 
acting on one’s sexual attractions.  They turn the essentialist mantra, “I’m 
attracted to a person of the same sex and I can’t help it,” into an affirmative 
statement:  “I’m attracted to a person of the same sex and, in today’s 
society, there is no reason I can’t show my true feelings.”  
Second, constructionist advocates capture reality in a way that essentialist 
advocates cannot by recognizing the range of choices a person may 
willfully exercise as a result of her sexual orientation. A well-known survey 
of sexual desires and attractions, the Kinsey study, details a variety of ways 
that people express their sexual attractions.30  The study makes a blur of the 
simplistic distinction between heterosexuals and homosexuals by revealing 
that most behavior cannot be plotted on a graph as belonging strictly to one 
group or another.31  This spectrum can only be captured by constructionist 
theory. 
Finally, constructionist advocates can help liberate gays from confusing 
stereotypes.  Instead of following the “heterosexual alibi,” constructionist 
advocates perceive each individual according to his own personal choices.  
They accept the fluid nature of human sexuality32 and recognize that there is 
no universal “gay experience” that accompanies a gay sexual orientation.33  
 I do not propose that constructionist theory is the answer to the gay rights 
movement; rather, I suggest that constructionist theory provides an answer 
to the troubling limitations of essentialist theory as it is currently 
expounded.  Through dialogue, constructionist advocates address the ways 
that people discriminate against gays34 and can create grounds by which 
gays can more meaningfully reclaim their autonomy.  The ways that people 
discriminate against gays include establishing heterosexuality as the 
standard by which all people must live35  and the harsh underlying 
heterosexist accusation that gays are immoral.36  The constructionist 
addresses this discrimination not by way of apology, as an essentialist 
might, but by asserting personal autonomy, conscience, and choice.  More 
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specifically, constructionist gay advocates engage opponents’ concerns by 
asking when it is appropriate for society to restrain freedom of choice, and 
if it is ever appropriate to impinge on a person’s freedom of conscience.37  
By engaging lawmakers and judges in the search for answers to these 
questions, constructionist advocates shift the focus away from protecting a 
victimized and victimizing class and toward honoring the dignity and 
autonomy inherent in following their own conscience.  In other words, 
constructionist advocates direct the gay rights movement away from 
victimhood and towards agency. 
B.  Hypothetical Conversations between Gay Rights Proponents and 
Opponents 
A simplified set of hypothetical arguments might help to frame the issue 
more clearly.  These hypothetical debates demonstrate the contours of 
essentialist and constructionist theory and underscore the strengths and 
weaknesses of each theory. 
The first conversation is between two essentialist theorists, one who 
opposes, and another who supports, gay rights.  Note in this conversation 
how each essentialist theorist emphasizes the immutable characteristics and 
“status” of being gay. 
Essentialist proponent:  “I’m gay.  It’s a condition that I can’t 
change.  I’m part of a class analogous to African Americans, 
whose movement for civil rights developed into recognition of 
rights that no one would openly deny them today.  It is time for 
recognition of my rights, too.” 
Essentialist opponent:  [Reluctantly] “That’s a pity that you can’t 
change what you are.  My son is also gay, and it pains me terribly 
to see him suffer.  I have resisted any recognition of rights until 
now, but I see you people just can’t help it.  Your rights should be 
recognized.” 
This conversation demonstrates that even if consensus is reached, the 
consensus is likely to be based on pity and victimhood.  The essentialist 
Victimhood to Agency 153 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005 
proponent of gay rights requests that the essentialist opponent recognize his 
rights because he cannot help being gay and is therefore a victim.  Notice 
that the essentialist opponent concedes, but only because she feels pity.   
Note also that the essentialist proponent is himself gay.  A heterosexual 
would not be as convincing in making the same argument unless he were 
arguing the more generalized notion of “justice for all.”  This suggests that 
perspective matters.  This is in part because the gay advocate for gay rights 
can evoke more pity by expressing contrition.  His message is essentially 
this:  “I’m gay.  I can’t help it.  (I’m sorry.)”   
The essentialist proponent also compares his own struggle for rights to 
the civil rights movement, a movement the essentialist gay rights advocate 
assumes is based on essentialism.  Many white gay advocates assume that 
African Americans assert their civil rights on the basis of skin color: “I 
can’t help being black.  I was born this way.”  But that assumption is 
incorrect.38  Rather, leaders of the civil rights movement simply demanded 
and continue to demand that African Americans be given the chance to 
make the same contributions and receive similar treatment as white 
Americans.39  They seek to be judged not by the color of their skin, but by 
their personal merit.40  Their argument for civil rights is not essentialist, but 
purposely constructionist.41  Just as the movement for rights for African 
Americans is based on merit, the movement for gay rights must also be 
structured on a merit-seeking theory.  Constructionist theory based on 
inviolable freedom of conscience is the more appropriate theory for 
accomplishing that goal. 
The second hypothetical conversation features the same essentialist 
proponent of gay rights and a constructionist theorist who opposes gay 
rights. 
Essentialist proponent:  “Being gay isn’t something I can change.  
Like African Americans, who have struggled for and won 
recognition for their basic rights, my gay brothers and sisters and I 
have struggled.  It is time that our rights are recognized.” 
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Constructionist opponent:  “Whether or not you can change 
being gay, it’s okay to be African American, but it’s not okay to be 
gay.  Just because you have a desire doesn’t mean you have to act 
on it.” 
This conversation reveals further limitations in essentialist theory.  The 
constructionist opponent of gay rights cleverly unveils the essentialist 
argument to show that there is some volition involved in sexuality.  If there 
is any “condition” central to being gay, the constructionist says, that 
condition is not the end of the story.  A person can still fake happiness by 
pretending to be heterosexual.  For example, a person can be gay but remain 
celibate so that no one has to know that he is gay.  Or, the same person can 
be gay but force himself to be intimate only with opposite sex partners in 
order to appease the majority non-gay society.42  The implicit message from 
the constructionist opponent of gay rights is the following: gay people must 
mold themselves to fit heterosexual behavioral norms, whether or not those 
norms are compatible with their innermost conscience. 
Gay rights advocates might find a solution to this dilemma when they 
employ constructionist theory to defend gay rights and to engage gay rights 
opponents in a more meaningful dialogue.  For an example of how this 
dialogue works, consider a third conversation between the same 
constructionist theorist who opposed gay rights in the last conversation and 
a new constructionist theorist who supports gay rights.  In this conversation, 
note that the theorists focus their exchange on choice and conduct, rather 
than on immutable characteristics and status. 
Constructionist proponent:  “It’s my choice to share intimate 
touch and feelings.  Who are you to insist that I can’t decide for 
myself who my partner will be?” 
Constructionist opponent:  “Sure, you have choices in life.  But 
it’s immoral to act on them to engage in intimacy with members of 
the same sex.  It’s simply not right.” 
Constructionist proponent:  “Your denial of my ability to make a 
very personal choice would restrict my free exercise of autonomy 
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and conscience.  Whether you choose to reflect on my actions as 
such, I know that my decisions reflect a clear conscience and sense 
of personal dignity.  No outside imposition of morality can change 
the intrinsic values or the clear conscience I possess.” 
The theorists in this conversation start by addressing personal integrity, 
or agency,43 and advance to address notions of societal morality and the 
inviolability of a person’s dignity.  Their conversation is an example of a 
genuine exchange that moves beyond pleas for pity and sympathy into a 
dialogue where value systems are compared and contrasted.  In this 
example, the constructionist proponent of gay rights takes responsibility for 
his own actions.  Furthermore, he does so without revealing whether his 
choices and actions reflect a gay sexuality.  In this example, sexuality is not 
at issue, freedom of conscience is. 
In sum, constructionist theory offers a more meaningful approach to gay 
rights than essentialist theory for two reasons.  First, constructionist theory 
is more liberating because it gives gay rights advocates a more empowering 
way to reclaim gay rights.  Instead of making a plea for rights based on 
immutable characteristics, constructionist gay rights advocates reclaim an 
inherent right to exercise one’s conscience.  Second, constructionist theory 
is more realistic because it acknowledges that human sexuality is dynamic 
rather than static, and that one’s choices with respect to intimacy are not 
conclusively determined at birth or by personal decisions throughout life.  
Through its liberating and realistic approach, constructionist theory avoids 
perpetuating stereotypes that establish unrealistic expectations for gay 
people.  At the same time, it offers a more meaningful basis for gay rights 
advocates to engage opponents in a dialogue about the value of personal 
integrity in American society today. 
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II. SEXUAL ORIENTATION, RACE, AND RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION 
A.  The Old Analog: Comparing Sexual Orientation to Race 
Case law can help demonstrate the underlying theories that shape 
litigation and the law concerning gay rights.  Although judges do not 
usually explicitly analogize racism to homophobia, they do make 
assumptions regarding the parties in court from which we can infer either an 
essentialist or constructionist posture.  Based on that inference, we can 
make an educated guess as to which analogy might support the judges’ 
conclusions.   
In the following two case examples, I consider the court’s implicit 
assumptions, infer whether the court employed an essentialist or 
constructionist paradigm, determine what analogy the court might have 
used to balance the parties’ relative rights, and review the courts’ final 
holdings.  The results of this analysis suggest that essentialist theory does 
not, for the most part, help advance gay rights, and that constructionist 
theory coupled with a new analog would strengthen the gay rights 
movement. 
First, the case of Thomas S. v. Robin Y. demonstrates how a court’s 
essentialist perception of gay families is detrimental.44  In this case, the 
court issued an order of filiation, a judicial determination of paternity, to 
force an already complete family to accept a sperm donor as a third parent.  
The court issued the order supporting the sperm donor even though, 
according to a mutual agreement between him and the two mothers, he 
never financially supported his biological daughter, and he did not call to 
inquire about the child for the first three years of her life.45  Although the 
majority opinion does not explicitly state that it employed essentialism to 
fashion its conclusions, we can look to certain passages in the opinion to 
deconstruct its essentialist leanings. 
The issue in Thomas S. was whether a sperm donor who is known to his 
daughter is entitled to a judicial determination of paternity.46  In this case 
Victimhood to Agency 157 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005 
Ry, a twelve-year-old girl, lived with her biological mother, Robin, and her 
mother’s lifetime companion, Sandra.47  Robin conceived Ry by artificial 
insemination using the semen of Thomas, who was gay and a known sperm 
donor in San Francisco.48  Ry was the second girl in the family after Cade, 
who was born to Sandra by artificial insemination two years before by a 
different sperm donor.49  The family lived in New York, where Thomas 
visited only occasionally during business trips.50  In accordance with an oral 
agreement between Robin and Thomas, Thomas did not support Ry 
financially or call her during the first three years of Ry’s life.51   
When Cade, then age five, started asking questions about her own sperm 
donor, Robin and Sandra made arrangements for Ry and Cade to meet their 
biological fathers in the presence of their mothers.52  Over the following 
six-year period, Thomas met with Robin and Sandra’s family for 
approximately twenty-six visits.53  Then, when Ry was eight years old, 
Thomas told Robin and Sandra that he would like to establish a parental 
relationship with Ry.  Robin and Sandra regarded this as a breach of their 
agreement.54  After Thomas initiated litigation, Ry expressed a desire to end 
all contact with her biological father.55 
Although the family court refused to enter an order of filiation in the 
case, characterizing Thomas as an “outsider attacking [Ry’s] family [and] 
refusing to give it respect,”56 a majority of the Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, found that Thomas had developed a sufficient relationship with 
Ry.  It reversed the Family Court’s decision and remanded the case with 
instructions to recognize Thomas as Ry’s father.57  Throughout the opinion, 
the majority implies that there is but one formula for parenting—a father 
and a mother—and it must be upheld regardless of how the family 
developed before litigation.  Implicit in the opinion is the essentialist notion 
that a lesbian woman can never complete a family by being the second 
parent.  In four different parts of its opinion, the majority drives home its 
vision of what a family ought to be. 
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First, the majority starts by championing Thomas as deserving a greater 
status than that of a mere biological father or sperm donor.  The majority 
seems to equate Thomas’ sperm donation with parental status, regardless of 
whether Thomas has acted in a parent-like fashion and regardless of 
whether the family already considers itself a complete unit: 
[T]he effect of the Family Court’s order is to cut off the parental rights of 
a man who is conceded by all concerned . . . to be the biological father.  The 
legal question is not . . . whether an established family unit is to be broken 
up. . . . Rather [it is] whether the rights of a biological parent are to be 
terminated.58 
Second, even though Thomas’ only connection to the family is his sperm 
donation and two dozen visits with the family as a whole, the court 
compares the biological and actual mother, Robin, and the sperm 
donor/biological father, Thomas, to a divorced couple: “No one would 
suggest that, in the typical case of divorce and remarriage of a mother, a 
father’s parental rights should thereupon be subject to termination because 
his intimate involvement in the child’s upbringing is no longer feasible or 
welcome.”59 
The inherently essentialist and heterosexist nature of the majority’s 
comparison can be fleshed out if we consider how the majority would opine 
using the same formula, but different facts.  Consider, for example, how the 
court would likely react to a request for an order of filiation if Robin and 
Sandra were Rob and Sandra, and if Thomas were Tomasina, the surrogate 
mother.  In that case, the court would probably find, using its essentialist 
filter, that Tomasina had no parental rights to see Ry whenever she pleased 
without Rob and Sandra present.  Rob, Sandra, Ry, and Cade would be a 
complete family, not by virtue of their conduct, but by virtue of their 
acceptable heterosexual status in the eyes of the court.60  By altering the 
facts, we see more clearly that the court in this case forces an image based 
on a heterosexist and patriarchal essentialism. 
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Third, the majority reconstructs Robin and Sandra’s family and the roles 
of each litigant according to an essentialist formula:  “The notion that a 
lesbian mother should enjoy a parental relationship with her daughter but a 
gay father should not is so innately discriminatory as to be unworthy of 
comment.”61   
The court asserts that if Robin, the biological mother, can have a parental 
relationship with Ry, so should Thomas, the biological father.  Notice, 
though, that in this part of the opinion, the majority subtly discards the 
“biological” label in order to refashion Thomas as the “father.” This role 
reconstruction helps put Thomas on par with Ry’s mothers, Robin and 
Sandra.  The majority’s implicit message is that a family run by two 
mothers is unacceptable.  The court must introduce a real father—not just a 
biological father or sperm donor—to make the family whole. 
Fourth, the majority cites the New York Domestic Relations statute to 
drive home its heteropatriarchical62 point:  “A child born out of wedlock 
will only be rendered legitimate by the subsequent marriage of the mother 
and a man admitting paternity or judicially declared to be the father.”63  By 
mentioning the concepts of “wedlock” and of “a mother and a man,” the 
majority again suggests that both the child and the family in which the child 
is born can only approach legitimacy if the court declares the petitioner 
sperm donor to be Ry’s father. 
In contrast to the essentialist paradigm employed by the majority, the 
dissent’s opening demonstrates a constructionist understanding of the 
family: “The complexity of human relationships that permeate this case and 
the contemporary reality of millions of households that maintain alternative 
family life styles strongly militate against the rigid, abstract application of 
legal principles, not designed for situations such as this . . . .”64 
After examining Thomas’ contact with Ry and considering what was best 
for her given her family structure, the dissent concluded that Thomas had no 
protected parental rights as a result of his failure for nearly ten years to 
assume the responsibilities of parenthood.65 
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The majority opinion in Thomas S., demonstrates all of the pitfalls of 
essentialist theory.  First, essentialism supports the view that one’s sexuality 
is a fixed condition.  To that condition, judges and lawyers are apt to affix a 
preset status.  In the case of Thomas S., the majority affixed to the condition 
of the two lesbian mothers the status of incomplete parenthood.  In contrast, 
the dissent’s constructionist argument challenged the majority to focus not 
on the status of the lesbian mothers and the gay sperm donor, but on their 
conduct as parents.  By focusing on Robin and Sandra’s conduct as parents, 
the dissent recognized that Robin and Sandra’s parenthood was complete 
and that, in contrast, Thomas was more aptly described as an “outsider.”66 
Second, essentialism is destructive in this instance because it fails to 
capture reality and fails, more specifically, to recognize the significance of 
social influences.67  The essentialist majority in this case operates according 
to a binary structure, whereby a family is not coded as complete until it 
features a man, a woman, and children.  In other words, the majority 
perceived Robin and Sandra’s parenting as one half of a heterosexual 
equation which can only be completed by the biological father, Thomas.  
The majority does not show signs of engaging in a constructionist dialogue 
to inquire whether this family is complete given the way Ry relates to her 
mothers and the way they relate to Ry.  Nor does the majority seem 
concerned with Thomas’ meager connection to Ry or his lack of father-like 
conduct.68 
Third, essentialism tends to promote stereotypes.  The court implies that 
there are clear differences between same-sex parents and opposite-sex 
parents.  It implies that only opposite-sex parents are legitimate, even 
though this view is not supported by any definitive studies.69  Thus, when 
the majority concluded that it must issue an order of paternity for Thomas, 
it relied on its own stereotype of what makes a complete family. 
The case of Thomas S. aside, there is merit to the argument that 
essentialism does not always harm gay individuals, couples, or families.  In 
fact, Romer v. Evans is one case in which the Supreme Court employed an 
Victimhood to Agency 161 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 1 • 2005 
essentialist paradigm to maintain basic rights for gays.70  However, the 
statute in question was an unprecedented attack on gays’ basic access to 
political processes.  The court itself characterized the attack as “rare.”71 
At issue in Romer v. Evans was the Colorado constitutional amendment 
that barred all legislative, executive, or judicial action to protect gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals.72  Amendment 2, adopted in a 1992 statewide 
referendum, was an antagonistic reaction to several municipal ordinances 
that had banned discrimination against gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in 
housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and 
welfare services.73  Specifically, the amendment read as follows: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual 
Orientation.  Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its 
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political 
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt 
or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby 
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or 
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle 
any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status 
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.  
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-
executing.74 
The Supreme Court examined the statute using an essentialist filter that 
stressed the status and inherent traits attributed to gays.  In particular, it 
emphasized the apparent discriminatory purpose of Amendment 2 against 
“persons by a single trait.”75  The court further acknowledged the “status-
based” nature of the act,76 and held that “[c]entral to our own Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of 
its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.”77  
By focusing on the essentialist status and traits of homosexuality and 
bisexuality under Amendment 2, the court found Colorado’s law to be 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.78  While the victory in this case protected gays from an 
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encroachment on their most basic civil right to access political processes, it 
was not a victory in which new ground was gained.79 
Thomas S., Romer, and their progeny suggest that essentialism, as it is 
currently expounded, is too limiting to meaningfully advance gay rights.  
While essentialism may help maintain rights in “rare” cases, the theory is 
less likely to help advance gay rights.  Meanwhile, gays face continuing 
violence, and discrimination in housing, public accommodations, 
employment, health benefits, adoption, child custody, child visitation, civil 
marriage, family-based immigration, and inheritance.  A new approach is 
needed.80 
B.  Call for a New Analog: Comparing Sexual Orientation to Religious 
Orientation 
The gay rights movement would benefit from a new analog that aligns 
the movement more easily with constructionist theory, a theory that 
emphasizes the autonomy inherent in being gay.  A more useful analog for 
the gay rights movement is to compare sexual orientation to religious 
orientation.  Ultimately, this analog can help link the familiar premise of 
religious rights to a new premise for gay rights: freedom of conscience.   
There are several useful comparisons that advocates can draw from this 
new analog.  First, religious orientation, like sexual orientation, 
encompasses a conscious belief or series of beliefs to which we may silently 
adhere or which we may share with a community.  Neither a religious 
minority nor a sexual minority may be singled out from a crowd of people 
under most circumstances; the individual’s status is often only known when 
she manifests her conscience.  Second, the religious or sexual minority 
individual may choose to exercise her conscience or refrain from exercising 
her conscience, depending on the nature of the community in which she 
lives and the extent to which she feels secure reaching out to others of 
similar orientation.  Third, just as a person’s religious orientation may alter 
during her lifetime to more aptly suit her conscience or experience, her 
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sexual orientation may also undergo change and adaptation.  Fourth, just as 
the identity of a religious minority is more accurately described by 
constructionist theory, so is the identity of a sexual minority.  For example, 
the extent to which a person’s religious or sexual orientation is more 
accepted or less accepted in a society will depend on the time in which a 
person lives, the culture, and most of all, the prevalent social mores.  Fifth, 
regardless of the societal or familial pressures a person may face with 
respect to his religious or sexual orientation, the personal determination of 
what is right and wrong ultimately depends on his own conscience.81   
There are a number of benefits that gay rights advocates can derive from 
analogizing gay rights to religious rights.  Constructionist gay rights 
advocates can move beyond the essentialist-based recognition that 
discrimination exists and into a more dynamic analysis of why there ought 
to be equal protection for people who have a minority sexual orientation.  
Utilizing the new analogy, gay rights advocates can invite faith-based 
groups to join in advancing both minority religious rights and gay rights 
through a common appreciation of freedom of conscience.82  Moreover, the 
analogy of religious orientation to sexual orientation can help foster a more 
positive image among gays who seek a less victimizing approach to 
claiming their own rights. 
The question of how advocates can analogize homosexuality to religion 
is one of unexplored legal strategy, perhaps in part because religious and 
gay groups in society are frequently seen as political adversaries.83  A 
simple comparison of how courts84 perceive rights based on sexual 
orientation versus how courts perceive rights based on religious orientation 
demonstrates that courts do not currently view gay litigants with respect to 
their freedom of conscience or expression in the same way they view 
religious litigants.  Niemotko v. Maryland is one case in which the Supreme 
Court addressed religious orientation with deference to the group’s freedom 
of expression. 
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In Niemotko, appellant Nietmotko and a co-appellant were members of a 
Jehovah’s Witness religious group.85  When the group submitted a request 
to city hall to use the city park for Bible talks, city officials denied them 
access.86  In spite of the city’s denial, the group proceeded with their plans 
because no statute required the group to secure formal permission.87  
However, when Nietmotko opened the meeting in the city park, police 
officers immediately arrested him.88  He and his colleague were charged 
with disorderly conduct, convicted, and fined.89  The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland declined review, but the United States Supreme Court took the 
case because it presented substantial constitutional issues.90 
In a concise constructionist opinion, the Niemotko court concluded that 
the city’s refusal to issue the group a license constituted clear “unwarranted 
discrimination.”91  The Court acknowledged that the only questions the city 
council asked appellants before denying them access “pertained to their 
alleged refusal to salute the flag, their views on the Bible, and other issues 
irrelevant to unencumbered use of the public parks.”92  The Court 
determined that it was clear from this irrelevant exchange that “the use of 
the park was denied because of the city council’s dislike for or 
disagreement with the Witnesses or their views.”93  Thus, the Court 
concluded that the refusal constituted a violation of the appellants’ 
constitutional rights to equal protection under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, which have “a firmer foundation than the whims or personal 
opinions of a local governing body.”94 
The deference the Supreme Court accorded to the appellants in this case 
based on their freedom of religion stands in stark contrast to the lack of 
deference accorded to the two mothers in the case of Thomas S.  There are 
at least three ways in which the Thomas S. court’s holding on gay rights 
differed from the Niemotko court’s holding on religious freedoms. 
First, although the Thomas S. majority claimed to focus on the rights of 
the father, to the extent that that focus was based on the majority’s 
disagreement with the mothers and their incomplete status as parents, the 
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focus amounted to what the Niemotko court would call “unwarranted 
discrimination.”95  If the Thomas S. majority had accorded as much 
deference to the conduct of the mothers, Robin and Sandra, as the Niemotko 
court accorded the conduct of the Witnesses, perhaps the Thomas S. court 
would have come to a more constructionist acceptance of the family unit 
consisting of two mothers and their children. 
Second, the Thomas S. majority insisted on perceiving the litigants as part 
of a heteropatriarchical96 world based on status where same-sex parenting is 
bad and opposite-sex parenting is good.  This binary vision of the litigants’ 
status is evidenced first by comparing the relationship of the actual mother 
and sperm donor to a divorced couple and second, by comparing Ry’s birth 
to a birth out of wedlock.  In contrast to the status-based essentialist 
paradigm the Thomas S. majority employs, the Niemotko court insisted that 
the same law apply to the same conduct, regardless of the differences 
among those who seek the law’s protection. 
Third, the Niemotko court expressly forbade stereotyping when it 
declared that constitutional rights will not be regarded or disregarded 
according to the “whims or personal opinions of a local governing body.”97  
The Thomas S. majority, on the other hand, seemed either unaware that it 
applied unproven stereotypes to the same-sex parents in question or 
unsympathetic to the consequences of its decision.98  Whatever the case 
may be, the majority clearly accorded less deference to the lesbian mothers 
in Thomas S. case than the Niemotko court accorded the Witnesses.99  
The Thomas S. and Niemotko cases present comparable rights issues.  
They suggest that to avoid discrimination courts should, but currently do 
not, treat freedom of conscience with the same deference, whether that 
exercise of conscience relates to sexual orientation or to religious 
orientation.100 
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CONCLUSION 
Essentialism has limited what gay rights advocates—including friends, 
family, and other allies—can achieve.  Advocates who use essentialist 
theory to promote gay rights inadvertently support a static image of 
sexuality in general and a victim image of gays in particular.  However, 
these advocates can overcome the limitations of essentialist theory if they 
premise their advocacy on a more constructionist-nuanced theory that 
focuses on autonomy and integrity, and if they emphasize the right to 
freedom of conscience that is analogous to the notion of religious freedom.  
Through this use of constructionist theory, gay rights advocates will entice 
judges and lawyers into a more meaningful dialogue that will advance, 
rather than simply maintain, rights recognition.  While these advocates must 
be aware that this new approach will not respond to all of the difficulties 
inherent in the gay rights movement, and while it may even create new 
dilemmas, I believe they will nevertheless find that using constructionist 
theory will empower gays more as agents rather than victims, and as 
conscientious actors who, in today’s society, have a right to make their own 
choices regarding sexuality.  This renewed sense of agency will help gay 
rights advocates cultivate more meaningful rights recognition to help 
protect against discrimination and violence. 
Perhaps most importantly, these advocates might begin to understand 
through constructionist theory that all forms of discrimination—racism, 
homophobia, and religious discrimination, and others—are based on social 
constructs.  Perhaps through constructionist dialogue we will all begin to 
learn that the perspective that matters for a rights movement is ultimately 
neither gay-specific, nor African American-specific.  The only perspective 
that matters is the human one, in all its complexity and with all of the 
possible personal choices and expressions.  Thus, when constructionist 
advocates revisit the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., that “injustice 
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,” they will draw on a comparison 
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that supports a more genuine dialogue, a better understanding, and a truer 
sense of justice for all. 
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Biblically-based “morality” to prohibit recognition of the rights of gays, courts do not 
apply the same Biblical code to fornicators, adulterers or divorcees.  Thus, if morality is a 
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interference in order to protect basic rights that the majority already enjoys.  For example, 
if gay rights advocates want to secure protection from employment discrimination they 
must convince the state to do two things: first, recognize that homophobia exists, and 
second, make the state’s courts available to provide a remedy to gays who have been 
fired as a result of homophobic discrimination.  Thus, when gay rights advocates adopt an 
analog to religious orientation, they should emphasize the general nature of the 
comparison to sexual orientation. 
